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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 779

Accident time: 09:53

Accident Date: 22/03/2007

Where it occurred: Nr Nunavil West,
Thenmaradichi District,
Jaffna Province, see
detailed map reference
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Sri Lanka

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Demolition accident

Date of main report: 24/03/2007

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
demolition site
(explosives)
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: IMASA [Sic]

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 404.766.00 E

Map north: 1,068.649.00 N

Map scale: Chavakachcheri

Map series: ABMP

Map edition: 01

Map sheet: 4

Map name: 1:50000

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
no independent investigation available (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is an IMSMA “tick-box”
record. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.
Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes
available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

IMSMA record extracts
Task: EOD task
Place of accident: field [GPS recorded] near residential buildings
Cause of accident: “Misjudgment of effectiveness of protective work.”
Reference to inquiry report
I have been to the particular spot together with the Programme Manger and Technical Advisor
from [other Demining group]. I explained the whole flow of the task, where we we found it,
where we moved it, position of all personnel during the demolition etc I have also giving them
all my records of timings and a narrative as below including pictures and a movie of the
demolition.
Accident description:
“The day of the accident [Dmeining group] was out in the field to do EOD tasks, UXO
clearance on request by DMAO of objects not safe to move or transport. This particular day
[Demining group] had planned to do 5 task but ended up in doing one more task, so totally 6
objects/UXOs was destroyed. All tasks was already surveyed and prepared for demolition,
protective work etc.
The accident demolition was the first that day in a row of six demolitions. The target was a
120mm artillery shell. Beforehand we had digged a 1.1 m deep pit away from the closest
village and had sandbagged the side towards the village. The shell was moved from where it
was found, by hand, into the pit just prior to setting up the demolition. The shell was by
purpose put closer to the wall in the pit that faced the village. When every thing was set up
and sentries were in place we carried out the demolition. The shell went high order. I could
short after - few seconds hear a few falling fragmentations around the firing point. I went
forward alone to inspect the demolition pit and gave all clear. On my way back to the firing
point the QA officer approached me and said that one of the deminers was injured, we walked
or to that position. The deminer was already taken care of by the medic. I was told that one
FALLING fragmentation (NOT DIRECT) had hit him on his left shoulder, right on to the collar
bone. There was three scratches or small cuts in the skin. The deminer was conscious the
whole time and said he had pain. When we came carried on to the next task and had done
the preparations, the deminer asked for permission to go to hospital as his shoulder / upper
arm was numb. I asked him and the medic if it could wait until we reached the next task and
could send him with another team’s truck so we could go on with the prepared and coming
demolition. They agreed so we carried on. When coming to the location of the truck I
arranged for the deminer to be transported to the hospital. After that I WAS TOLD that they
cleaned some sand out of the small cuts and X-rayed him (See medical report). He was
released from hospital after one day of observation. The accident is reported to the police in
Chavakachcheri as well.
Device: 120mm artillery shell.
Victim did not wear Protective equipment.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 965

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 22

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 90 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Shoulder
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "Small cuts".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim
was in range of shrapnel from the demolition, was not wearing PPE and was not taking cover.
The person with field responsibility should have ensured that he was. The secondary cause is
listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because it seems that the accident was treated
as “unavoidable”, which implies that the system in use was approved by the management and
no need to make changes was recognised.
The delay in sending the Victim to hospital after he reported that his arm was numb cannot be
excused by having a lot of other tasks to get done and implies considerable irresponsibility on
the part of the ex-patriot field supervisor responsible.
With no report other than the notoriously inadequate IMSMA form, it is not clear whether the
demining group drew any conclusions from the accident.
IMSMA accident records have always been over-simplified and entirely “Inadequate” for use
in determining causes and so deriving any useful lessons from the events. The UN supported
MAC in Sri Lanka has generally failed to conduct independent investigations and has failed
(despite requests) to make any available records available to the DDAS, so ignoring the
requirements of the IMAS.
The Demining group involved in this accident is thanked for its transparency in making their
record available.
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